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Summary  findings
Vernier- uses a unique  data  set (combining  information  *  rhe  more  training  and education  workers  have,  the
about  individual  workers  wit'h information  about  the  higher  their  wages and  the greater  their  productivity.
ftrms  eniploving  them)  to  jointly  estimate  production  Productivity  differences  can be  demonstrated  for
htnctions  and  wage equations.  This approach  allows  her  five levels of education  completed.  The  productivity  gap
not  only  to assess the  marginal  impact  on  wages  of  is grcater  than  the wage gap.
demographic  and other  characteristics  but  also to  *  Returns  to education  are similar  across  gender,
compare  how  these  variables  affect  productivity  among  sectors,  and  level of unionization,  but  they  are lower  for
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employees,  but  this negative  wage  premium  does  not  to in-house  training)  is associated  with  higher  wages  but
reflect  commensurately  lower  productivity.  appears  to have no  (immediate)  impact  on  productivity.
Employees'  experience  is reflected  equally  in wages  *  Trade  union  members'  wages are  in line  with
and  in productivity  differentials  over the  worker's  life  productivity.  Both  wages  and  productivity  are higher  for
cycle. Wages  and productivity  both  increase,  but  at a  union  members  than  for non-union  members.
decreasing  rate.
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This paper studies labor market outcomes in Ghana. The analysis focuses on the formal
manufacturing wage sector and, more specifically, on the determinants  of wages and
productivity for various groups of workers. It tests hypotheses  that relate to the impacts of
individual and enterprise characteristics  on wages. Furthermore, it compares the marginal
impact of each of these characteristics  on wages with their respective impact on labor
productivity.  The results may indicate whether, for example,  there exists a spot labor
market, discrimination, and/or structural differences among sectors and groups of
workers.
The paper analyzes whether experience,  training, and education  impact wages and
productivity. In recent years, analysts have paid a lot of attention to the impacts of
education and labor force training. The rationale for investing in human capital is that a
more skilled and educated labor force is more productive than a less educated one.
Therefore, policymakers  emphasize  investment in human capital because they believe
that, in general, it increases labor productivity. However,  there is not have much evidence
of this relationship in the Africa region.'
This paper aims partially at filling this void by presenting evidence  on the direct
impact of education,  training, and experience on productivity for different groups of
workers using econometric regression analyses. It looks at whether Ghanaian labor
markets are characterized  by gender discrimination.  It analyzes whether the labor markets
1 Glewwe (1996) finds that there is no return to human capital in Ghana.
3are competitive. And it looks at whether union membership, manufacturing sector, and
firm location affect labor market outcomes.
I use data from the 1994 Regional Prograrn on Enterprise Development (RPED)
survey on Ghana, which covers 215 manufacturing  enterprises  ranging from micro
enterprises to very large enterprises. The questionnaire  used in the data collection process
has two related parts: one for management and one for workers. In addition, about 10
randomly selected  workers from different occupational  categories were interviewed  in
each enterprise. The RPED dataset matches employee  and employer data and contains
detailed information  on both. The two types of information  are merged from individual
data on skills, education,  and age, and from firm-level information  about sector,
production, sales, and employment.
Empirical studies of the determinants of wages and earnings inequality have
focused primarily on factors affecting labor suppl,y.  Long-run labor supply factors include
variables such as education, age, gender, and experience. 2 Few studies have used
variables controlled  by the employers,  the so-called demand factors. One reason is that in
most industrial and developing countries  more infbrmation  has been collected on workers
than on their employers.
The lack of data on worker productivity  constrains empirical research related to
issues of wage determination.  For example,  without direct measures  of productivity,
2 Groshen (1991la)  mentions that education,  age, occupation,  ethnicity, gender, and union
variables account for only 51 percent of the variation in the log of wages, analyzing (US)
data from the Current Population Survey One Quarter Earnings Sample, 1986.
Introducing demand-related  factors is likely to explain part of the 49 percent of the
variation in wages that workers' characteristics  cannot explain.
4discrimination by gender or ethnicity cannot be established correctly.  Many studies of
wage determination  report positive coefficient estimates on the age of an employee,
conditional on a variety of covariates.  These estimates  neither imply that older workers
are more productive than younger ones, nor that wages rise faster with productivity
because no bridge has been made between productivity and wages (see Hellerstein,
Neumark, and Troshe 1996). These  problems may be overcome  by estimating the wage
and productivity equations  jointly and, thus, comparing wages and productivity for
various groups of workers.
Section two describes  the methodology  and data used in this study. Section three
outlines the wage determination  model used. Section four shows descriptive statistics
and presents regression results. Section five presents conclusions.
2. Data and Methodology
I carry out this study with the so-called RPED dataset from the 1994 survey in Ghana.
The survey included 215 firms and interviewed  about 1,20C'  of their employees. This
matched employee-employer  dataset has many advantages compared with datasets of just
employees. An employee dataset may contain information  about the sector in which a
worker is employed but little information  about the firm. An employer dataset has
information about the firms but limited information  about the individuals actually
employed in the firms, apart from aggregate wage costs and, in some cases, information
5about aggregate education  and training costs. The employer-employee  dataset allows
detailed analyses  of hypotheses related to both firms and individuals.
Unfortunately,  many of the variables in the 1994 round of the Ghana RPED
dataset have very few observations.  This is the case, for example,  for the share of exports
in output, expenditures on research and development,  and foreign licenses. Hence, these
variables are excluded, so that the regression analysis includes relatively few enterprise-
level controls.
I use the so-called general-to-specific  econometric  methodology in the regression
analysis. I apply this methodology  by formulating  a general model and then reducing it to
a parsimonious specification by eliminating statistically  insignificant  variables one by
one, while focusing mainly on the determination  of wages. The more parsimonious
specification includes only statistically  significant  variables in the wage equation.
The general wage model contains explanatory  variables in levels and some are
also included in quadratic form, hence allowing for nonlinearities in the data. The natural
log wage equation or the production  function may be quadratic in variables such as
experience. This way of modeling may capture that the return to experience is not
constant but rather decreasing over the life cycle. Additionally,  I introduce dunmmy
variables that take the value of one if, for example, the worker is a member of a trade
union and zero otherwise.  Inclusion of this variable may reveal whether there is a wage or
productivity premium related to union membership.
I use simultaneous single-level  statistical models. These models may cause
aggregation  biases equivalent  to problems produced in the learning achievement
literature. In this literature, workers are the units of observation and firms are included in
6the individual vector of variables. It is worth noting that, in general, this methodology
may cause aggregation  biases in two ways. First, it may overestimate  the group effect,
that is, the firm effect, on productivity. Second, it may underestimate  the individual effect
on wages and productivity.  Multi-level estimation  takes aggregation  biases into account.
The firm-level effect impacts average production and the individual slope of, for
example, gender. And the gender effect may be different in different firms. Furthermore,
the group level effect may not be the same for every single worker. However, the
hierarchical linear modeling software does not allow for missing observations.
Additionally, small firms have too few employees to actually perform the multi-level
analysis. Due to these data limitations,  I report only the results obtained by estimating
single-level models.
3. Modeling Wages
Competing models of wage determination  depend on the connections among wages,
productivity, and employee-employer  characteristics.  Standard  wage determination
analyses (single-equation  wage models) consider employee  characteristics  in the process
of determining wages, but make no link to productivity. Standard  analyses rarely consider
employer characteristics.  I analyze wages, productivity,  and employee-employer
characteristics  simultaneously.  Without direct measures of the relative productivities of
employees, discrimination by gender,  for example, cannot be based only on statistically
7significant estimated coefficients  on the respective dummy variables in the individual-
level wage regression.
Standard single-equation  wage regressions  report positive coefficients on age
conditional  on a variety of covariates.  These regressions  do not imply that wages increase
faster than productivity  or that older employees are more productive than younger ones.
Therefore, it is important  to analyze  productivity  and wage determination  simultaneously.
The regression analyses describe monthly wages and productivity in the formal
manufacturing sector, conditional on individual and firm characteristics.  The following
equation explains the wage and productivity:
lny=IpI+ZF6.
The dependent variable (y) is a vector containing  two variables: wages (w) and
productivity (v), thus enabling a richer analysis than when applying the standard single-
equation wage determination  model. The vector of explanatory  variables in the analyses
consists of firm/employer characteristics  (F), the so-called demand factors, and employee
characteristics (I), the supply factors. When  y is reduced to scalar w, the traditional wage
determination  model appears. ,3  and o are vectors of parameters  revealing the marginal
impacts of the explanatory variables on wages and productivity.
The production function is estimated in a value-added  form for two reasons. First,
the input variables, such as materials, may be endogenous. By applying this
specification,  the analysis does not need to estimate the coefficients on materials. Second,
this specification embeds contrasting  production function specifications.  For example, in
8one specification,  the elasticity of substitution is zero, so that:  materials have to be used in
fixed proportions. In another specification,  the elasticity of substitution is infinite (see
Grilliches and Ringstad 1971).
There are several  reasons for including various worker characteristics.  A trained
and educated  workforce provides flexibility in adapting to changes in technology or other
economic changes that a firm and an economy may face. Experience and years of
schooling  are widely used in analyses of wage determination  and inequality (see Welch
1969 and Mincer 1974).3 The wage bargaining literature has emphasized institutions
such as trade unions as an important  factor in the process of determining  wages. Gender
and ethnicity variables reveal information  on the female-male  wage gap and wage
differentials associated  with different nationalities.  If discrimaination  exists, it may be
indicated by these variables having significant  parameters.  Including the sector of
employment enables testing competitive  economic theories, some of which predict that
the sector of employment has no impact on earnings differences for similar workers. And
the location of an enterprise may be important  because, for example,  life in cities is
generally more expensive than in towns. Workers may be compensated  for the higher cost
of living. Section three discusses each group in more detail.
I estimate the wage equation and the value-added  equation  jointly by regressing
them on the same independent  variables. The estimated individual  coefficients and
standard errors produced by multivariate  regression are identical to those that would be
produced by estimating each equation separately.  The difference  is that, because
'See Levey and Murnane (1992).
9multivariate regression is a joint estimator, it also estimates  the between-equation
covariances.  Therefore, coefficients  can be tested across equations to reveal whether costs
are in line with productivity.
The analysis assumes that employees with different characteristics  are perfect
substitutes in the production  process, but with potentially different productivities. The
individual-level  wage and production  equations are estimated simultaneously,  allowing
for comparison of the average productivities  and wages of employees distinguished  by
various characteristics.  This empirical setting may reveal new information on selected
issues related to the determination  of wages in Ghana. For example,  it may provide
evidence about gender discrimination  in wages and the causes of increasing remuneration
over the life cycle.
When equality of the parameter estimates  of a particular variable in the two
equations cannot be rejected statistically,  I interpret  this result as evidence compatible
with the existence  of competitive  spot labor markets. Rejection of equality of the
parameter estimates points toward noncompetitive  labor markets or discrimination. The
analysis allows productivity  to vary by type of employee and by type of enterprise by
adding controls for enterprise characteristics,  such as sector and region. 4
4 There are numerous studies of the Ghanaian labor market. Canagarajah  and Thomas
(1997) analyze returns to education.  Jones (1994) studies wages and productivity of
workers in the manufacturing  sector. Teal (1995) investigates  whether the decline in real
wages reflects the existence  of a competitive  labor market in Ghana. Velenchik (1995)
focuses on apprenticeships  in the manufacturing  sector. Teal (1996) analyzes the possible
existence of economic  rents within the manufacturing sector.
104. Determinants of Wages and Productivity
Appendix table A-  I lists the variables and describes  the construction of each variable.
Appendix tables B-  I through B-4 present the results of joint estimation of the wage
equations and production functions,  controlling for both firm and employee
characteristics.  The variables that cannot be rejected as statistically  insignificant are
eliminated one by one from the general model and the final selected wage model is
presented in the tables in appendix  B.
4.1 Differentials by Formal Education
Human capital has proven important  in enhancing long-term economic growth. 5 A more
educated workforce is likely to increase worker productivity, show innovative  behavior,
and facilitate the adoption and use of new technologies.  The increasing speed of
technological  change that firms face today and increasing initernational  economic
integration call for workers to have higher skill levels in order for firms to be competitive.
One reason is that more skilled employees can adjust more easily to changes in the
economic and technological  environment  than less skilled workers.
Knowledge about economic  returns to human capital gives insights about the
extent to which it is worth undertaking  this particular investment  compared with other
types of investment. Therefore, it is of interest to estimate the impact on money wages of
different kinds of education, training, and other experience.  This analysis may indicate
11areas where scarcity in training and education  may exist because the existence of a wage
differential due to training may be interpreted as rent (to skilled labor).
Education in Ghana. The system of education  in Ghana consists of up to 17
years of pre-university education:  six years of primary school, followed by four years of
middle school and seven years of secondary  school. After pre-university education,
higher education includes professional.  polytechnic, or university education. 6
Table 1. Education  by Gender and Resiidence  in Ghana (percent)
Gender  Residence
Educational level  Female  Male  Accra  Other
completed
None  15.1  8.0  5.4  15.9
Primary school  1.6  3.8  2.9  4.3
Middle school  31.4  48.9  46.5  48.8
Secondary school  18.4  12.4  14.7  9.2
Vocational school  23.8  11.4  13.6  15.2
Professional and technical  8.7  14.3  15.2  6.1
schools
University  1.1  1.3  1.8  0.6
Total
Percent  100  100  100  100
Note: The values show the percentage of each category of workers with each level of education. For
example, 15.1  percent of the females in the sample have not completed  any level of education.
Source: Round Three of the 1994 Regional Prograrn  on Enterprise  Development for Ghana.
5 See Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
6 In 1987,  the education sector  was reformed and pre-tertiary education was reduced to a
total of 12 years.
12The distribution of education  from the RPED data across gender and geographical
regions reveals that in the formal manufacturing  sector, the majority of workers have
completed middle or secondary  education (see tables 1 and 2). The data contain three
notable features. First, middle school is the most conmmon  level of completed education
(46 percent). Second, almost twice as many employed females as males have not
completed any education. 7 Third, fewer of the workers employed in Accra (9 percent)
have completed less than secondary  education,  compared with workers employed
elsewhere in Ghana.
Table 2 presents the percentage of workers in each sector that has completed each
level of education. Most notably, the share of workers with no or primary education is
quite small in the metal sector (6 percent) compared with the average share across all
across sectors (13 percent). University  graduates make up the largest share in the food
sector (3 percent).
Table 2. Education by Manufacturing  Sector (percent)
lvlanufacturing  Sector
Educational level completed  Total
Manufacturing  Metal  Textile  Food  Wood
None  9.3  3.7  1]0.0  16.6  7.8
Primary school  3.3  2.0  3.8  3.9  3.5
Middle school  45.8  50.8  46.7  35.5  58.3
Secondary school  13.5  12.6  4L3.8  15.4  8.7
Vocational school  13.6  15.0  40.7  13.5  13.0
Professional and technical schools  13.3  15.6  13.9  12.0  7.9
University  1.3  0.3  [.0  3.1  0.9
Total
Percent  100  100  [00  100  100
7Note that only 17.9  percent of the sampled workers are women and less than 0.5 percent
are non-Africans.
13Note: The values show the percentage of each category of workers with each level of education. For
example, 9.3 percent of all manufacturing workers in the sample have not completed  any level of
education.
Source: Round Three of the 1994 Regional Program on Enterprise  Development for Ghana.
Impact on wages. The estimated coefficients  on the education  variables in the
wage equation reveal the impact of human capital obtained from education on wages
controlling for other individual and firm characteristics  (see appendix  table B-1).8 The
impact on wages of each of the six categories  of completed  education (primary, middle,
secondary, vocational,  technical, and university) is statistically  significantly different
from zero (no education  completed being the category of reference).  This result indicates
that the more education a worker has completed, the higher wage the worker receives,
conditional on a variety of individual  and enterprise covariates,  including occupation. The
estimates show that the size of the wage premium to education increases rapidly with
completed level of education.
The wage gap is 51 percent for workers wh1o  completed  primary education,
compared with those who did not complete any level of education. An employee  who has
completed middle school obtains a wage premiurn of 41 percent. The wage gap is 56
percent for secondary  graduates and 186 percent for university graduates. These results
are in line with those of Canagarajah  and Thomas (1997), who find that workers in Ghana
who have completed tertiary education  earned 2.7 times more than illiterate workers in
1991.
8 The results reported in the text are exponential  transformed estimates  reported in
appendix B
14Hence, formal education  has an impact on manufacturing  wages, but it is not
monotonically increasing. In fact, the analysis  cannot reject the hypothesis that the
estimated coefficients  for primary, middle, and secondary  education are of equal size
(F(pri=sec)=0.04,  Prob>F=0.83;  F(sec=mid)=1.54,  Prob>F=10.22;  F(mid=pri)=0.16,
Prob>F=0.69; and F(sec=voc)=2.84,  Prob>F=0.09).  Wage analyses of industrial countries
usually find that the incremental  returns to education  fall as the level of schooling  rises.
However, the above results indicate that the returns do not fial in Ghana for the formal
manufacturing sector. An employee who has completed  technical or vocational education
also receives a statistically significant  premium in addition to that already captured by
occupational controls and experience. The wage premiums are 48 percent and 20 percent,
respectively (see appendix table B-1).
These results indicate that education  has spillover effects on productivity,
meaning that education's aggregate  contribution  to output may be larger than its costs.
The endogenous growth literature has emphasized  these spillover effects or positive
externalities that result from increasing returns to scale in the production function due to
educational or learning externalities  (see Lucas 1988).  The spillover effects of education
may result from entrepreneurial  ability to speed up the adaptation  of technology
throughout the market.
Impact on productivity. The regression results show that education enhances
firm-level productivity in Ghana. The country's manufacturing  sector has a positive and
marginally significant  production differential by completed education above primary
level. Primary education does not contribute  to productivity  because it does not have a
15statistically significant impact on value added. ThLe  quality of primary education may be
low or not sufficiently high so as to benefit value added in firms. This result may indicate
that there is a private return to obtaining a diploma, which serves as a screening device
when hiring labor. Workers who have completed rniddle school education contribute  on
average 3  72 percent more to value added than workers with no completed schooling.
University and secondary school graduates contribute 660 percent and 287 percent,
respectively. Furthermore,  technically  trained workers and employees who have
completed  vocational training provide 185 percent and 127 percent, respectively, more to
value added  than do workers  with no completed  education (see appendix table B-1).
Wages  and productivity. The wage differentials  by education fall behind
productivity differentials  by education  and significantly  so for completed middle and
secondary education. The test rejects the hypothesis of equality of the wage and
productivity differentials.  For completed  middle and secondary school, the test rejects the
hypothesis that the workers are paid according to their productivity in both cases (F=  14.2,
Prob > F=0.00; F=6.24, Prob > F=0.0  1). Hence, the positive wage gap between workers
with completed secondary  education  and no completed education can be completely
justified by higher productivity. Furthermore,  workers with completed secondary
education could demand higher wages so as to match productivity.  This result also holds
for completed middle school education.
Several reasons may explain why the workers do not demand higher wages. They
may not be aware of the magnitude of the impact completed education has on
productivity. Workers may not be aware of the extent and importance of knowledge
16spillovers in the manufacturing  sector.  In addition, in Ghana, educated  people have been
loosing jobs in the last five to ten years. Thus, demanding  higher wages may lead to more
job insecurity. The findings may not indicate a shortage  cf educated  employees or a lack
of demand because  these results would be out of line with the standard assumption  that
wages reflect the productivity of labor. Another explanation  may be that knowledge
spillover effects, which are not instantaneously  reflected in pay, indicate that social
returns in a firm are higher than private returns.
The cost of a university graduate seems to be in line with firms' benefits because
the results do not reveal any discrepancy  between productivity and returns to education.
The test for equal coefficients in the wage equation and production function cannot be
rejected at conventional levels of significance  (F=1.39,  Pirob  > F=0.34). However, the
small number of university graduates in the sample may affect the results. Another
explanation may be that this group of workers obtains  higher enumerations  than revealed
by wages. Also, earnings  may include fringe benefits thali  often are large in the
manufacturing sectors in Africa.
For both completed vocational and technical education,  wages are not in line with
productivity (F=4.48,  Prob > F=0.04; and F=4.72,  Prob > F=0.03). Productivity exceeds
wages in both cases, implying that workers with completed vocational and technical
education are under-compensated  as compared with their productivity.
When substituting  the individual  school attaimneint  variables with a continuous
variable for completed education,  the other explanatory  variables' impacts on wages are
unchanged. There exists a significantly  positive return to holding a permanent contract,
but the impact on value added is insignificantly different from zero. The completed
17education variable is statistically  significantly different from zero. The education
premium obtained from completing an additional level of education  is 15 percent,
conditional on a variety of individual and enterprise covariates (see appendix table B-2).
The effect on productivity  is statistically  significant  and the size of the impact is 54
percent.
Education  has a less pronounced  influence on wages than it has on productivity,
except for completed  primary education.  This result is illustrated by the significance and
larger coefficient  estimate of formal education in the productivity  equation than in the
wage equation. Therefore, researchers should be carefiul  in interpreting  the traditional
earnings function approach as a means of estimating the effects of, for example,
education on productivity. Policymakers  often use results from earnings function
estimation to make decisions about public expenditures.  The findings here indicate that
wages are not always a good proxy for the physical product. They suggest  that
enterprises in Ghana do not always "get prices right," ihat is, wages do not equal
productivity.
4.2 Differentials by Occupation and Skill
Table 3 shows some differences  in the occupations of employees due to gender.
More women than men work in administrative  activities and more men than women hold
managerial positions. The table also shows that more than half of both male and female
18employees work in production. Only professionals and commercial  workers each account
for less than 10 percent of the total sample.
Table 3. Gender and Occupation (percent)
Full
Occupation  sample  Female  Male
Administration  11.8  25.4  8.8
Commercial  6.7  7.6  6.5
Manager  10.0  5.4  11.0
Production  54.9  54.1  55.1
Professional  3.5  1.6  3.9
Support  13.2  6.0  14.7
Total
Percent  100  100  100
Note: The values show the percentage of each category of workers with each level of education. For
example, 25.4 percent of all female manufacturing workers in the sample work in administration.
Source: Round Three of the 1994 Regional Program on Enterprise D)evelopment  for Ghana.
Table 3 divides the employees into six groups  by occupation:  manager
(encompassing  managers, supervisors,  and foremen); administration (administrative
workers and clerks); commercial  (commercial  workers, salespeople,  maintenance
workers, and technicians); support (support staff); production (production  workers); and
professional (engineers,  accountants,  and others). The regression analysis reveals that
only the impact of managers is statistically  significant anid  positive in the wage equation,
controlling for other individual and firm characteristics.  The reference  group for the
analysis is workers in maintenance,  skilled production workers, other production workers,
support staff, and trainees. The calculated occupational  wage premium is 33 percent for
managers and -40 percent for support staff (see appendix table B-1). Surprisingly, the
estimated productivity of managers is not statistically significantly  different from that of
19the reference group. Productivity differentials  by occupation  do not fall behind wage
differentials, as revealed by the rejection of all tests oi equality between the two estimates
(F(jobsupp)=2.67,  Prob > F=0.1O  and F(jobman)=O.01',  Prob > F=0.93).
I use the occupational data to test for the possibility of a gap in returns between
skilled and unskilled labor in Ghana. Skilled workers are those in the manager,
administration, and professional,  occupations. Unskilled  workers are those in the
commercial,  production, and support occupations. The skilled employees may receive
higher returns to experience, sector, training, education, unionization,  occupation, and
location than unskilled employees. The results are based on the inclusion of interaction
variables in the analyses. A dummy  variable that takes the value one if the employee is
unskilled is interacted with the variables presented in appendix  table B-1.
The findings indicate that the returns to education  and, in particular, to having
completed middle and secondary  education,  are lower for unskilled than skilled workers
(see appendix table B-4). The comparison  group is workers who have not completed any
level of education.  The unskilled workers who have completed  middle school earn returns
23 percentage points lower than skilled workers do(see appendix table B-4). The
productivity analysis reveals that unskilled workers are not statistically less productive
than skilled workers. The economic  return to completed secondary education is 24
percentage points lower for unskilled than for skilled workers.
4.3 Differentials by Trade Unions
20Twenty-nine percent of the employees in the sample  belong to trade unions. The
data show that female workers  are not less unionized than male workers. In contrast, the
data show an education-unionization  gap; workers who have completed university
education  and those with just primary education fall below the average level of
unionization (see table 4).
Table 4. Union Membership  and Education  (percent)
Total
Educational level completed  Union  Non-union  Percent  Number
Full sample
Percent  28.7  71.3  100
None  23.2  76.8  100
Primary school  14.7  85.3  100
Middle school  27.4  72.6  100
Secondary school  28.1  71.9  100
Vocational school  37.9  62.1  100
Professional and technical schools  34.3  65.7  100
University  0.0  100.0  100
Note: The values show the percentage of each category of workers vvith  each level of education. For
example, 14.7  percent of the manufacturing workers in the sample who have completed primary school
belong to unions.
Source: Round Three of the 1994 Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana.
Table 5. Union Membership  and Occupation  (percent)
Total
Occupation  Union  Non-union  Percent  Number
Full sample
Percent  28.7  71.3  100
Administration  40.2  59.8  100
Commercial  33.3  66.7  100
Manager  26.2  73.8  100
Production  24.1  75.9  100
Professional  16.7  83.3  100
Support  40.4  59.6  100
21Note:  The values  show  the percentage  of each  category  of workers  with  each level  of education.  For
example,  40.2 percent  of the manufacturing  workers  in  the sample  who  work  in  administration  belong  to
unions.
Source:  Round  Three  of the 1994  Regional  Program  on Enterprise  Development  for Ghana.
Workers in administration and support occupations  have the highest share of
workers in unions; workers in manager and professional  occupations have the lowest
share (see table 5). It appears that unionization  makes a difference  in wages because the
union premium in the Ghanaian  manufacturing  sector is statistically significant  and
positive (see appendix table B-1). Union members earn more than nonunion members do,
when controlling  for firm and individual  characteristics  in the wage equation.
In addition, union members  have statistically  significantly higher productivity
than nonmembers do. The test of the hypothesis  that the wage and productivity gaps are
of equal size is highly rejected (F=68.44,  Prob > F=O.00).  The estimated wage differential
associated with being a union member is approximately 16 percent (see appendix table
B-1). This outcome is in line with results found for industrial countries, which usually
reveal that union members earn more than nonunion members. These results may provide
evidence that trade unions do not reduce wage differentials  and, therefore, that unions
negatively affect the distribution of income.
The finding for Ghana may be surprising because other African studies of the
impact of unions on wages report a negative association. Both results for CFA countries
applying a cross-section  dataset of African countries (Rama 1997) and results from wage
analyses in Zimbabwe (Verner 1998)  show that trade unions impact wages negatively.
The presence of trade unions is generally  associated with more firm-provided  training.
Trade union bargaining at the firm level may increase social welfare by counterbalancing
22a firn's  monopsonistic power in wage determination  (see, for example,  Booth and
Chatterji 1997).9
4.4 Differentials by Employer-Led  Training
In industrial countries, governments  have increasingly  ermphasized  the importance of
employer-led  training. The benefit of training should be in the form of higher output.
Training provides workers with the skills necessary for improving competitiveness,
adaptability, and growth. Furthermore, skill acquisition  may reduce wage inequalities.
In addition to informal on-the-job  training by supervisors  and co-workers,
employers may supply formal training, either in-house or by outside providers. The
incidence of training in the Ghanaian  manufacturing  seci:or  is relatively high compared
with industrial and semi-industrial  countries. Around 64 percent of the employees  receive
formal structured  training. In the sample, 28 percent of the workers received in-house
training (see table 6).  This value is in line with the data for Taiwan, where 38 percent of
large firms and 4 percent of small firms train employees in-house (see Tan and Batra
1995). Furthermore,  36 percent of the Ghanaian  employees received training outside the
firn.
'Booth  and Chatterji (1997) show that long-term contracts are socially optimal when
workers are trained because the training reduces workers' incentives  to quit and leave
with the skills obtained. Alternatively,  wage bargaining by firms and local unions may
ensure that the post-training wage is set sufficiently  high to defer inefficient quits, and
thus to ensure that the number of trainees the firm takes on is near the socially optimal
number. Hence, it would be expected  that the results here would show higher post-
training wages.
23Table 6. Gender, Residence,  and Training  (percent)
Gender  Residence
Training  Full sample  Female  Male  Accra  Other
In-house  28.0  33.0  27.0  25.1  34.2
By outside providers  36.2  24.7  38.7  38.0  35.4
None  35.8  42.3  34.3  36.9  30.4
Total
Percent  100  100  100  100  100
Note:  The values  show  the percentage  of each  category  of workers  with  each  level of education.  For
example,  28.0  percent  of the manufacturing  workers  in  the sample  received  in-house  training.
Source: Round Three of the 1994 Regional Program on Enterprise Development  for Ghana.
The incidence of training is only marginally  h:igher  for firms in Accra, compared
with firms outside the capital (see table 6). Fewer fem,ale  employees receive training
outside the firm and more receive training inside the firm than male workers do. Forty-
two percent of the female workers  are not trained, conapared  with only 34 percent of the
male workers. Investigating sector  differences in the incidence of training reveals that the
wood sector trains relatively fewer workers than the other sectors. Only 24 percent of all
employees do not receive any training, while 32-37 percent of workers in the wood sector
do not receive training .More support staff receive training than workers in other
occupations do.
Table 7. Occupation  and Training (percent)
Administr  Comme  Professi  Product  Support  Manager  Full
Training  ation  rcial  onal  ion  sample
In-house  11.6  14.7  8.6  35.7  29.6  20.4  28.0
24By outside  providers  47.9  29.4  45.7  30.5  44.4  42.7  36.2
None  40.5  55.9  45.7  33.8  26.0  36.9  35.8
Total
Percent  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Note:  The  values  show  the percentage  of each category  of workers  with  each  level  of education.  For
example,  11.6  percent  of the manufacturing  workers  in the sample  who  work  in administration  received  in-
house  training.
Source:  Round  Three  of the 1994  Regional  Program  on Enterprise  Development  for  Ghana.
Only 26 percent of support staff do not receive any training, compared with the
average  of 35.8  percent  across  all occupations  (see  table 7). Employees  in commercial
and sales  occupations  receive  the least  training;  55.9  percent  of this group  does  not
receive  any kind  of training  (table  7). University  graduates  receive  the most  training,  76.9
percent  (see  table 8).
25Table 8. Education  and Training  (percent)
Educational level completed
Training  None  Primary  Middle  Second  Vocati  Professio  Universit  Full
school  school  ary  onal  nal and  y  sample
school  school  technical
schools
In-house  30.9  23.5  24.8  37.9  13.4  14.7  0  28.0
By outside  35.1  41.2  30.7  32.7  40.3  44.9  76.9  36.2
providers
None  24.0  35.3  44.5  29.4  46.3  40.4  23.1  35.8
Total
Percent  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Note: The values show the percentage of each category of workers with each level of education. For
example, 30.9 percent of the manufacturing  workers in the sample with no completed  level of education
received in-house training.
Source: Round Three of the 1994 Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana.
In-house training. The hypothesis that training has no impact on wages is not
rejected  for training  within  the  enterprise.  This  result  indicates  that  in-house  training  does
not directly contribute to measurable  wages. In addition, formal training obtained within
the firm is not significantly  more productive than the training workers obtain from
colleagues in an informal way. The results hint that in-house training is not productive;
however, it seems more likely that the impact is not instantaneously  revealed in wages
and productivity. Initially, there is no measurable effect of in-house training in the data,
but effects may be measurable at a later date.
Training by outside  providers. The analysis rejects the hypothesis that training
supplied by outside  providers has no impact on wages. Workers who have undergone
formal, structured training outside the firm earn 16  percent more than workers who have
not been trained (see appendix table B-i). However,  the regression results indicate that
training is not associated with higher firm-level productivity.  In terms of the level of
26parameter estimates  and in a statistical sense, the productivity-enhancing  effects of
training are not important for training obtained outside or inside the firm.
The productivity effects of skilled  worker training are estimated to be not
significantly different from zero. This result is surprising  because studies of other low-
income countries have found a statistically  significant  impact. For example,  Tan and
Batra (1996) find significant coefficients  of 1.43  for Indonesia  and 0.39 for Columbia.
Verner (1998) finds a statistically  significant  coefficient estimate of 0.33 for Zimbabwe. I
find that training by outside providers is not associated with increased productivity in
Ghana, possibly because the impact of training is not instantaneously  reflected in
productivity.
Underinvestment in training. From the regression analysis, it appears  that Ghana
underinvests in training. Evidence  of underinvestment  is suggested by significant  returns
to outside training, reflecting its relative scarcity. Training activities generate  skills and
knowledge that are employee specific in the sense that the employee may quit and take
the accumulated  human capital away from the firm. This possibility makes trained
employees more valuable  to the firm than other workers, including workers from other
firms.
Acemoglu and Pischle (1997) show what happens when the current employer has
superior information  about the worker's ability relative to other firms. This information
advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony  power over the worker, which
encourages the firm to provide training. Acemogil and Pischle's model can lead to
multiple equilibria.  In one equilibrium,  quits are endogenously  high; as a result,
27employers have limited monopsony  power and are willing to supply little training. In
another equilibrium, quits are low and training is high. It wvould  seem to be valid to apply
this model in the African context, where job mobility and the number of quits are low in
the formal sector.
Firms in Ghana provide little or no training for several  reasons. The country has
imperfect capital markets, limited access  to information,  and other market failures. The
results for employer-led  training seem to imply that policies that encourage increased
enterprise training will lead to larger productivity gains for the economy as a whole.
However, the results here show that in-house  training does not pay off in terms of higher
wages. It may be that the effect is not captured by the available data. The failure of
training to increase productivity would cause a disincentive  to invest in training. The
policy implication is presumably that Ghana should promote training by outside
providers.
4.5 Differentials by Experience
Labor market experience  is not easy to measure. However,  the labor market literature has
used the age of an employee  as a proxy. The worker's age is included in the wage
equation both in levels and squared to allow for possible nonlinearities. Both age
variables are statistically significantly  different from zero and have the expected signs
(see appendix table B-1). Experience  affects wages positively and the relationship is
nonlinear, controlling  for other individual and enterprise characteristics.  More
28experienced  workers have higher levels of labor productivity;  the productivity curve is
steeper at the early stage of a worker's life than later. Put differently,  the estimated life
cycle wage profile in Ghana has the usual quadratic shape known also from industrial
countries. The positive effect of experience on wages is increasing for younger workers
and continues for older workers at a decreasing rate.
The productivity  profile in the Ghanaian  manufacturing sector follows the pattern
of wages; it increases  at a decreasing  rate over the life cycle. However,  the wage gap and
the productivity gap are not equal in size (F=4.41, Prob > F=0.04; F=1.42; Prob >
F=0.22). These results indicate that the increase in productivity obtained from a more
experienced  workforce is larger than the costs.
4.6 Differentials by Apprenticeship
Apprenticeships  are widespread  in labor markets in Sub-Saharan  Africa (see Velenchik
1995). In Ghana, 10.2 percent of the sampled  workers have been apprentices in the firm
in which they currently work. Moreover, the share of apprentices  does not seem to differ
significantly across gender. The trainees often pay for their training in Ghana. The
economic rationale is that an apprenticeship  raises future productivity and thereby
increases future earnings by more than the current fees.
The results of the empirical analysis show that employees who have been
apprentices  do not obtain higher wages than others do. T'he  analysis  detects no positive
return to apprenticeships,  controlling  for formal education and other individual  and firm
29characteristics  (see appendix  table B-1). The point estimate of the wage differential is -
0.31 and the wage gap is significantly  different from zero, controlling  for individual and
firm characteristics.  For the value-added specificatiorn,  the estimate of the productivity
differential is negative but statistically  insignificant.  HIence,  the negative wage premium
is out of line with productivity.
4.7 Differentials by Gender
Empirical research on gender pay gaps has traditionally  focused on the role of gender-
specific factors, particularly gender differences in quailifications  and differences in the
treatment of otherwise equally qualified male and female workers (that is, labor market
discrimination)." This section explores  the determinanits  of the gender pay gap and argues
'  Modem explanations  of the gender  wage gap rest on two pillars: the human capital
interpretation  and models of labor market discrimination. The human capital explanation
was developed by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and others. This idea is based on
productivity differences  between men and women and, therefore, differences occur in
economic outcomes in the form of pay and occupation.  The human capital model builds
on the traditional division of labor in the family. According  to this theory, women have
fewer incentives to invest in human capital than men because women anticipate fewer
work weeks over their life span than men. The result is that women have lower human
capital investment  than men do and consequently wornen  have lower wages. The same
arguments are thought to cause gender differences in occupation,  as females choose
occupations where human capital investment  is less relevant and penalties for spells of
labor force interruptions are smaller. Models of labor market discrimination builds on
work originating  from studies on ethnic discrimination.  For example, Becker (1957)
conceptualized  discrimination as taste or personal prejudice against a specific subset of a
larger group. A related type of model is the so-called  overcrowding  model (see Bergmann
1974). It builds on exclusion of a group, for example,  women, from "male" occupations
and, therefore, leads to excess supply of workers in "women's" occupations. Despite
equally productive workers, the excess supply suppresses wages in "women's"
occupations.
30for the importance of an additional factor in the analysis, namely productivity.
Furthermore, it takes into account the possible difference  in prices set for labor market
skills and the rewards received for employment  in favored sectors.
In empirical research on the evidence of discriminiation,  traditional single-
equation models rely on the existence  of a residual gender  pay gap that cannot be
explained  by gender differences in measured  qualifications. This is seen to accord well
with the definition of labor market discrimination,  that is, wage gaps between groups that
are not explained by productivity differences, see Blau 1996. Blau notes that pay
differences between groups may also reflect group differences in unmeasured
qualifications or compensating  differentials.  If men are more highly endowed with
respect to these omitted variables, then discrimination  would be overestimated.  However,
if some of the controls (for example,  occupation)  themselves reflect the impact of
discrimination, labor market discrimination  will be underestimated.
The analysis  here reduces these caveats by comparing estimated differences in
wages and productivity and controlling  for the same measure of qualifications in both
equations. Under perfect competition in the capital and labor markets, equivalent
employees at equivalent  jobs are compensated  equally, that is, there is no discrimination.
The analysis concludes that labor force discrimination exists in Ghana only if both the
following hypotheses are rejected: (1) the impact on wages and productivity of being a
woman is zero; and (2) the estimated impacts on wages and productivity are of equal size.
Female workers comprise about 17 percent of the interviewed  workers in the
sample. The regression analyses reveal that, on average, females  are paid statistically
31significantly  less than male workers, controlling for differences in qualifications and
individual and other characteristics.  The wage gap between men and women is notable at
a general level in the Ghanaian manufacturing  sector. Women are paid 17 percent less
than men (see appendix table B-1). It seems dubious that this result occurs because
women are less productive than men, taking into account segregation  by gender across
labor market sectors and the level of qualifications such as education  and experience.  The
analysis controls for sector of occupation,  so that it takces  into account the possibility of
larger rents received by workers in favored sectors, imiplying  that it would be harder to
detect possible discrimination.
The point estimate of the productivity  differential is found to be statistically
different from zero and negative.  Female workers are 37 percent less productive than
male workers, accounting for qualifications,  occupation,  and sector of occupation.  Does
that mean that there is gender discrimination  in the Ghanaian  manufacturing sector? Both
the wage and productivity  gaps are significant  and the former is lower than the latter. The
analysis tests whether the coefficients are statistically  the same in the two equations and
rejects the hypothesis of equality (F=1.08, Prob > F=0.30).  This result is not consistent
with parts of the wage gap being attributable  to discrirnination  against women. In fact, the
results indicate that women receive more compensation in terms of wages than their male
colleagues. Further analysis shows that the lower wages that Ghanaian  women earn do
not seem to originate from being employed in the textile sector. The results show that
women working in textiles do not earn less than their male colleagues, controlling  for the
textile sector and other covariates.
32The analysis looks at whether the wage structure is important  in the determination
of wages for men and women in Ghana. I test the hypotheses that some sectors have
larger returns to skills, all else equal, leading to a larger gender gap; these hypotheses are
all rejected. I also consider  the possibility that women may receive lower returns to
experience, sector, training, education,  unionization,  occupation,  and location than their
male colleagues. The outcome indicates  that there are no gender  differences in returns to
the four levels of formal education or technical education,  unionization,  or occupation.
The analysis yields statistically  insignificant parameter  estimates of interaction variables
of the female dummy variable with each of the explanatory  variables. However, the
results indicate that women receive lower returns to experience  than men (around 1
percentage point). The results hint that increased female experience  impacts productivity
less than increased male experience (see appendix table B-3). The results across sectors
show that women are paid more than men in the wood sector (142 percent), despite not
being significantly  more productive.
The analysis now considers the possibility of a gap in returns between male and
female labor in Ghana. I analyze  whether male employees  receive higher returns to
experience, sector,  training, education,  unionization, occupation,  and location  than do
female employees. The education premium is neither larger for males than for females
nor does there exist any particular sector  premium related to education. The Analysis,
including education  variables for both males and females, shows that females do not
obtain a significantly lower return than do men in any of the six levels of education.
Surprisingly,  the gender-wage  differentials  by level of education are not very strong and,
334.10 Differentials by Contract
There are good economic  reasons why, in many circumstances,  it is in the interests of
both the employer and the employee  to form a long-nm employment relationship,  thereby
helping to build and retain firm-specific  skills. The estimated wage differential associated
with permanent employment  in a firm is estimated to be statistically  insignificant. Hence,
there does not seem to be a trade-off between enhanced job security and wages. The
contrary view that job security endows insider workers with more bargaining  power that
makes it possible to achieve higher wages does not seem to hold in Ghana. The result that
greater job security seems not to lead to lower wages suggests that insider workers benefit
from trade unions.
The productivity differential associated with a permanent contract is positive but
not statistically significantly  different from zero. Moreover, temporary workers are not
less productive than permanent  workers, indicating  that the former may be working hard
in an attempt to obtain a permanent  contract.
4.11 Differentials by Marriage or Ethnicity
The marriage premium is not statistically  significantly different from zero. This finding is
surprising because results from wage analyses in industrial countries usually show that
married workers earn higher wages than unmarried workers.  This finding reflects that
36married workers are more productive-whether  because of selection or a true
productivity effect-or  that firms discriminate in favor of married workers. No good
theoretical argument explains why married workers should be paid more. However, the
Ghanaian manufacturing sector data show that married workers are more productive than
unmarried workers, even though the difference  is not revealed in earnings.
I could not analyze whether differentials  by ethnicity exist in manufacturing in
Ghana because too few Europeans or other ethnic groups were interviewed (less than 0.5
percent of the interviewed  workers are non-African).
5. Conclusion
I used a unique dataset from Ghana that combines data on individual  workers with data
on workers' employers to estimate plant-level production functions and wage equations. I
compared relative productivities and relative wages for various groups of workers and
jointly estimated wages and output functions. This approach allows not only for assessing
the marginal impact of demographic  or other characteristics  on wages, but also
comparisons of the impact of these variables on productivity.
The analysis found that wage differentials  match productivity  differentials for
certain groups of workers, while for others they do not. Female employees are generally
paid less than male employees and the negative wage premium females receive does not
match the corresponding  negative  productivity  premium. Females' returns to schooling
and training are not different from those of males.
37Employees' experience, as measured by age, is reflected equally in wages and
productivity differentials over the life cycle. Both wages and productivity  increase, but at
a decreasing rate. However,  the impact of experience on productivity  is significantly
higher than on wages. These results indicate that the increase in productivity obtained
from a more experienced workforce is larger than the costs. However, other
compensations may not be reflected in wages, and these may be distributed unequally
across the life cycle, for example,  allowances for children's education.
In the formal manufacturing  sector, the majority of workers have completed
middle or secondary  education. The size of the wage premium to education increases
rapidly with completed level of education  and with occupation.  The size of the positive
returns to education for primary, secondary, and micldle  school are not statistically
significantly different. Furthernore, the analysis reveals productivity differences for five
levels of completed education: middle; secondary; vocational;  technical; and university.
Primary education does not contribute  to increased productivity.  University graduates are
worth the high returns and, in fact, the productivity differential is in line with the wage
premium. This is not the case for middle, secondary.  technical, and vocational education,
where the productivity gap is significantly larger than the wage gap. Hence, the positive
wage gap between workers with completed middle, secondary,  vocational, technical, or
university education and workers with no completed primary education can be justified
because the former groups are also more productive than the latter.
For workers in management, the analysis establishes productivity and wage
differentials  that are in line with economic theory. The analyses show that returns to
education are not different across gender, unionization,  or sector. However, they are
38lower for unskilled than skilled workers and the former are not less productive.
Furthermore,  returns to experience  are lower for women than for men. The results suggest
that the educational curriculum  above the primary level in Ghana is providing  workers
with productive skills. The study suggests  that wages are not always a good measure of
productivity for public expenditure  decisions.
The incidence of training in the Ghanaian manufacturing  sector is relatively high
compared with industrial and semi-industrial  countries.  The incentive for investing in
training is that it leads to higher output. The results reveal the existence of an asymmetry
in training: training supplied by outside providers is associated with higher wages, while
there does not seem to be any (instantaneous)  effect on productivity. In-house training
does not have a productivity enhancing effect and it is nol:  instantaneously  rewarded in
the form of higher wages. Therefore, a scarcity of trained workers may exist to some
degree. The results show that policies encouraging increased training and education will
lead to larger productivity gains for the economy.
Apprentices  obtain a negative  wage premium, but they are neither more nor less
productive than their colleagues  who have not been apprentices.  Workers employed in an
enterprise located in Accra are both more productive and paid higher wages than workers
in other locations. Furthermore,  the productivity  differeni:ial  is significantly  larger than
the wage differential.
Employees in the wood sector are paid lower wages than employees in the
textiles, metal, and food sectors. Employees in the wood sector are less productive than
employees in other sectors. However,  the impacts on wages and productivity are of equal
magnitude.
39Long-term contracts do not help firms to retain and build firm-specific  skills. The
analysis does not indicate that there is a trade-off between enhanced  job security and
wages or that job security endows insider bargaining power. The trend in manufacturing
employment has been increasing slowly since 1982, which further strengthens  this result.
However, the productivity differential  associated with a permanent contract is not
different from zero, indicating  that neither temporary nor permanent workers lack the
incentive to work hard. Temporary workers  are just as productive as permanent workers.
And trade union members' wages are in line with productivity.  Wages and productivity
for union members are higher than for nonunion members.
Altogether, the results indicate that the labor mnarket  in Ghana is not perfectly
competitive, but segmented.  For example, wages are not equal for workers with similar
skills employed in different sectors. Thus, the analysis finds structural differences across
sectors.
The analysis compared coefficients  on education  from the production function
with coefficients  from the wage function.  It showed  that fimns  behave competitively and
pay workers with completed university education  according to their productivity.
However, for all other levels of education, firms do not behave competitively;  they pay
either more or less than workers' productivity. The former category encompasses  primary
education and the latter middle and secondary education.
The results obtained in this paper indicate that the workforce employed in the
manufacturing sector in Ghana adds more to firm-level productivity  than the costs it
involves. Thus, wages are out of line with productivity, possibly due to externalities  or
spillover effects, for example, in skills. Hence, the le  vel of wages is not too high to
40compete internationally.  Furthermore,  the analysis  provides evidence  that increased
human capital, through training or education, as it benefits both productivity and wages.
Economic policies aiming at increasing  productivity  in Ghanaian enterprises and, hence,
long-run economic growth, should emphasize  the training and education of the
employees.
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43Appendix  A
Table  A-1.  Variable  Definitions
Variable  Definition
Accra  I if individual  is working in a firm in Accra
Africa  I if employee  is African and zero otherwise
Age  age of an employee
Appr  I if employee has been in an apprentice  in the finm  and zero otherwise
educom  completed  level of education
Empl  number of employees in the firm
Europea  I if employee is European and zero otherwise
Exportsh  export share in produced output
Female  I if employee is a female and zero when a male
Food  I if individual is working in the food sector
Foreigli  1 if firm holds foreign licenses
Found  1994 - year business was founded
Jobamnd  I if employee is currently doing administrative or clerical work
Jobcom  1 if employee is currently doing commercial/sales  work, working in maintenance, or as a
technician
jobman  1 if employee is currently working as a manager or supervisor/foreman
Jobprod  I if employee is currently working as a production worker
jobprof  I if employee is currently a professional (engineer, accountant, etc.)
Jobsupp  I if employee is currently working as support staff
Kumasi  1 if individual  is working in a firm in Kumasi
Married  I if employee is married and zero otherwise
Metal  1 if individual  is working in the metal sector
mid  I if individual  has completed middle school
Mowage  monthly wages
Mowork  number of months employed in the firm (tenure)
Non  I if individual  has no completed  education
Numexpat  number of expatriates in the firm
Other  I if individual  is working in a firm in another location
Permem  I if employee is permanent and zero otherwise
Pri  I if individual has completed  primary school
Proftech  I if individual  has completed  technical/polytechnic  o:r  professional education
Sec  I if individual  has completed  secondary school
Textile  1 if individual is working in the textile sector
Train  I if employee has been trained inside the firm and zero otherwise
Training  I if employee has been trained and zero otherwise
Trainou  I if employee has been trained outside the firm and zero otherwise
Uni  1 if individual  has completed  university
Union  1 if employee is member of a labor union and zero otherwise
Valad  value added: total value of sales minus costs of raw material inputs and indirect costs
(electricity etc.)
Voc  I if individual has completed vocational  education
Wood  I if individual is working in the wood sector
Note:  The prefix I indicates  that it is the natural logarithm  of a variable and d that it is a dummy variable which takes
the value one or zero. The suffix 1 indicates  it is the first wave of the RP]ED  data and sq denotes that it is the square
of the variable.
Variable  Interaction variables













































































Table B-1. Wages and Productivity
Log value added  Log monthly wages
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  t-statistic  P  >tl  Coefficient  Standard  t-statistic  P>Itj
error  error
Accra  0.856  0.205  4.174  0.000  0.167  0.068  2.454  0.015
Age  0.146  0.045  3.224  0.001  0.050  0.015  3.308  0.001
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -2.030  0.043  -0.001  0.000  -2.482  0.013
Apprentice  -0.153  0.288  -0.529  0.597  -0.364  0.095  -3.811  0.000
Constant  10.248  0.872  11.757  0.000  8.991  0.289  31.162  0.000
Female  -0.408  0.240  -1.698  0.090  -0.155  0.079  -1.947  0.052
Manager  0.255  0.334  0.763  0.446  0.284  0.111  2.567  0.011
Middle school  1.552  0.316  4.907  0.000  0.344  0.105  3.289  0.001
Primary school  0.348  0.546  0.638  0.524  0.410  0.181  2.270  0.024
Secondary school  1.353  0.358  3.778  0.000  0.447  0.119  3.769  0.000
Support  staff  -0.992  0.295  -3.367  0.001  -0.504  0.098  -5.172  0.000
Technical school  1.347  0.433  3.113  0.002  0.394  0.143  2.750  0.006
Trainingbyoutsideproviders  0.092  0.211  0.439  0.661  0.149  0.070  2.136  0.033
Union  2.087  0.232  9.015  0.000  0.146  0.077  1.911  0.057
University  2.028  0.818  2.480  0.014  1.052  0.271  3.885  0.000
Vocational school  0.820  0.299  2.746  0.006  0.180  0.099  1.818  0.070
Wood sector  -0.720  0.289  -2.496  0.013  -0.327  0.096  -3.426  0.001
Note: See appendix table A-I for variable definitions.
Source: Author's calculations.
46Table B2. Wages and Productivity  Including a Continuous Variable ifor Education
Log value added  Log monthly wages
Variable  Coefficient Standard t-  P>ItI  Coefficient  Standard  t-statistic P>jtj
error  statistic  error
Accra  0.776  0.204  3.814  0.000  0.161  0.067  2.423  0.016
Age  0.161  0.046  3.540  0.000  0.046  0.015  3.083  0.002
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -2.484  0.013  -0.001  0.000  -2.355  0.019
Apprentice  -0.086  0.291  -0.294  0.769  -0.367  0.095  -3.857  0.000
Completed level of education  0.434  0.069  6.318  0.000  0.137  0.022  6.077  0.000
Constant  9.632  1.015  9.486  0.000  8.587  0.332  25.835  0.000
Female  -0.542  0.237  -2.287  0.023  -0.182  0.077  -2.346  0.020
Manager  0.266  0.330  0.806  0.421  0.295  0.108  2.736  0.007
Permanent employee  0.415  0.689  0.602  0.548  0.425  0.226  1.882  0.061
Support staff  -0.851  0.295  -2.891  0.004  -0.504  0.096  -5.224  0.000
Training by outside providers  0.036  0.213  0.168  0.867  0.131  0.070  1.876  0.061
Union  2.234  0.229  9.758  0.000  0.146  0.075  1.945  0.053
Wood sector  -0.512  0.288  -1.778  0.076  -0.273  0.094  -2.894  0.004
Note: See appendix table A-1 for variable definitions.
Source: Author's calculations.
47Table B3. Wages and Productivity Including  Female Interaction Variables
Log value added  Log monthly wages
Variable  Coefficient Standard  t-statistic  P>ItI  Coefficient  Standard t-  P>}tj
error  error  statistic
Accra  0.887  0.205  4.327  0.000  0.192  0.067  2.886  0.004
Age  0.157  0.045  3.484  0.001  0.055  0.015  3.784  0.000
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -2i.212  0.028  -0.001  0.000  -2.802  0.005
Apprentice  -0.104  0.289  -0.359  0.720  -0.358  0.094  -3.816  0.000
Constant  10.060  0.843  11.929  0.000  8.897  0.274  32.422  0.000
Female x age  -0.020  0.008  -2.585  0.010  -0.009  0.003  -3.526  0.000
Female x wood sector  0.700  0.717  0.977  0.329  0.882  0.233  3.784  0.000
Manager  0.218  0.334  0.655  0.513  0.268  0.109  2.467  0.014
Middle school  1.546  0.313  4.932  0.000  0.328  0.102  3.216  0.001
Primary school  0.336  0.542  0.621  0.535  0.400  0.176  2.265  0.024
Secondary school  1.371  0.358  3.834  0.000  0.437  0.116  3.752  0.000
Support staff  -1.028  0.294  -3.495  0.001  -0.516  0.096  -5.389  0.000
Technical school  1.366  0.431  3.169  0.002  0.400  0.140  2.852  0.005
Training by outside providers  0.060  0.210  0.283  0.777  0.127  0.068  1.861  0.063
Union  2.080  0.231  9.017  0.000  0.141  0.075  1.880  0.061
University  2.080  0.815  2.553  0.011  1.081  0.265  4.077  0.000
Vocational school  0.803  0.298  2.690  0.007  0.153  0.097  1.573  0.117
Wood sector  -0.864  0.316  -2.735  0.007  -0.494  0.103  -4.803  0.000
Note: See appendix  table A- 1 for variable  defiitions.
Source: Author's calculations.
48Table B4. Wages and Productivity Including  Unskilled  Worker Interaction  Variables
Log value added  Log monthly wages
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  t-statistic  P>Itl  Coefficient Standard error  t-statistic  P>Itl
error
Accra  0.851  0.205  4.159  0.000  0.178  0.067  2.652  0.008
Age  0.146  0.045  3.232  0.001  0.052  0.015  3.468  0.001
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -2.034  0.043  -0.001  0  -2.603  0.010
Apprentice  -0.079  0.290  -0.271  0.786  -0.410  0.095  -4.308  0.000
Constant  10.251  0.869  11.791  0.000  8.952  0.286  31.347  0.000
Female  -0.504  0.241  -2.090  0.037  -0.117  0.079  -1.480  0.140
Manager  0.465  0.346  1.346  0.179  0.172  0.114  1.515  0.131
Middle school  1.371  0.334  4.107  0.000  0.462  0.110  4.217  0.000
Primary school  0.337  0.542  0.621  0.535  0.414  0.178  2.323  0.021
Secondary school  0.991  0.389  2.550  0.011  0.554  0.128  4.339  0.000
Support staff  -0.971  0.297  -3.273  0.001  -0.537  0.097  -5.509  0.000
Technical school  1.338  0.430  3.112  0.002  0.396  0.141  2.807  0.005
Training by outside providers  0.143  0.210  0.681  0.496  0.124  0.069  1.798  0.073
Union  2.115  0.230  9.185  0.000  0.137  0.076  1.810  0.071
University  2.147  0.818  2.625  0.009  1.046  0.269  3.891  0.000
Unskilled x middle school  0.383  0.263  1.460  0.145  -0.265  0.086  -3.069  0.002
Unskilledx secondary school  0.972  0.432  2.250  0.025  -0.277  0.142  -1.955  0.051
Vocational school  0.821  0.298  2.757  0.006  0.169  0.098  1.728  0.085
Wood sector  -0.772  0.287  -2.686  0.008  -0.305  0.094  -3.228  0.001
Note: See appendix table A-1 for variable definitions.
Source:  Author's calculations.
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